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Chinese Rise and Future of Global Governance: Assessing China's Role in Reshaping International System

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the new characteristics of China's engagements in global governance and how these engagements are transformative in world politics. This paper adopts secondary data collection and implements a quantitative approach for data analysis retrieved from Kaggle. This study follows statistical tests in SPSS to analyze how China's economic performance relates to its responsibilities in the international system. The research findings mean that while China's GDP and economic growth correlate with its rising power, the state and character of foreign affairs dip, diplomacy, and geopolitical governance are not a direct function of economic power. This work further enriches the global governance debate by discussing the comprehensive coverage of the multi-faceted aspects of the Chinese appearance and providing support to the arguments regarding the concept of a gradual, multilayered process where economic indicators do not divide power. This study explores that more forceful efforts should be made to incorporate the other political, cultural, and institutional variables into the study and to learn more about the impacts of China's strategic actions on the modern international system.

Keywords: Global Governance, China's Economic Growth, International Relations, Power Transition Theory,

Belt and Road Initiative, Quantitative Analysis.



Introduction

In recent decades, China has become one of the global hegemons in politics that affect the global political system. China has accelerated the pace of economic development and expanded its sectors and relevance across the world and in every sphere regarding platforms and affairs of international relations (Zaman & Kalirajan, 2019). This has expanded a condition once dominated by the Western hegemon as far as international relations were concerned and put in order by the Western prerequisites. New conditions demand from the subject of World Politics that it overemphasizes the study of China's actions within the international system and its relevance.

China is acquiring better economic power, making it possible to fund and contribute to several organizations globally, starting with the United Nations and other regional advancement banks. In addition, the state plays an important role in restructuring the international political economy. The Chinese involvement in global initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative BRI points to the external representation of the wish to assume a much larger slice of global power (Yilmaz & Xiangyu, 2019). These innovations call for given considerations on the likelihood of a change in global power relations and dynamics of cooperation and conflict among actors in the international system. Studying China's evolving interactions offers many insights into how a rising power can be socialized into the global community.

This article aims to critically assess China's role in reshaping the international system, with specific objectives to:

To analyze China's strategies in key global governance institutions.

To evaluate the impacts of China's economic policies on global trade and investment patterns.

To investigate China's diplomatic and military initiatives and their effects on international norms and relationships.

Likely to predict future trends in global governance in light of China's rising influence.

The role of China in global governance has changed, and it is necessary to examine how it studies these issues. China's activities and efforts are on the rise, and they are redesigning the processes and performance of some of the most significant and influential global organizations. This shift offers important information on how a new power balance is recasting the parameters that define international relations. It is necessary for learning, theoretical enhancement, and, more importantly, real-life policy formulation and planning (Yu, 2020). For policymakers and international actors, a more profound cognition of these strategies helps predict and accommodate the benefits and risks of China's emergence. This foresight is important in developing diplomatic and economic cooperation and strategies that will complement or in some way meet China's strategies. Examining different aspects of China's presence gives an understanding of various processes in cooperation and confrontation and can serve as a tool for forecasting worldwide cooperation (Tan & Soong, 2022). Due to the existence of multiple dominant powers in the world, the effects of each actor's actions and conduct on the rest must be analyzed. China's role on the global stage is the largest and most significant; therefore, understanding its influence on governing the world is a crucial area of study for anyone who participates in international relations and global strategy.

The article's structure is semantically planned to provide a detailed and complex view of the consequences of China's growth for the international system. All the sections are designed to expand on the work of previous sections, so the resulting analysis is comprehensive and grounded

in the present state of affairs in the global world. The Literature Review provides the historical backdrop and the conceptual underpinnings relevant to global governance and China's part in this emergent area. This section provides a literature review and theoretical development for the subsequent discourses on China's strategic orientation and role in world affairs. Understanding and analyzing the details of China's international relations seems fundamental. The Methodology present section explains the quantitative research design together with the source, procurement of secondary data from the Kaggle website, and notes on the analytical method with a focus on the SPSS software used. This part is important as it emphasizes that the correct cardinality of the statistical methods used was employed, thereby increasing the study's credibility. Data Analysis comes next, whereby the findings from the statistical analysis are portrayed and explained. This section identifies cases that show that China is conforming or non-conforming to international norms for governance and offers an assessment of China's approach in the global sphere. The discussion section compares the findings with the literature discussed earlier and broadens the outlook by providing policy implications for global governance to cater to the existing literature and policy implications. The conclusion summarizes the key conclusions and contributions of the study, calls for further research on China's position in contemporary international relations, and outlines potential research directions. This last twofold reminds us of the importance and pertinence of the study in light of existing geopolitical discourse.

Historical Context

China's historical evolution of the international system can be described as a story of phenomenal change and strategic evolution. Since the Cold War ended, China's economic liberalization processes have paved the way for its new order as a world superpower (Weissmann, 2019). These reforms aimed at opening up the economy, inviting foreign investment, and updating industries, lifting China to the world's economic leaders by the end of the 20th century.

Similar to the growth in GDP, China rose in terms of economic power, and it also grew in the international political realm. The growth of its economy also allowed the country to have a more expanded place in the top tier of international organizations. China needed its veto strength at the United Nations and established a muscular influence over worldwide matters such as human rights and environmental policies. Its participation in the World Trade Organization protected its international trade stakes and contributed to its authoritative position in the world economy (Nye Jr, 2020).

China's participation in the global governance transformation in the early years of the 21st century. The BRI turned from simply participating in global systems to becoming an active and strategic leader. The BRI is a network of infrastructure projects covering several continents to add more channels and expand the combined markets with China at the center (Li et al., 2020). It is an economic strategy and geopolitical play that increases China's effect in the participating countries.

The formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) also highlighted China's desire to offer a different monetary institution to supplant old-world organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Established to fund infrastructure across the Asia-Pacific region, China can mobilize the region for cooperation that will adhere to its standards and pursue the norms and policies that the Chinese government holds dear.

Knowledge of this history is critical to understanding China's current approaches to managing global affairs (Jenkins, 2022). As China pressed on with its expansionist policy, the global players had to operate in a world that slices, and China's strategies were defined. The strategies analyzed

point to the changes already present in international relations. They may indicate that shortly, China may challenge the existing order and suggest a new world order vision.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical concepts are important tools that enable scholars to analyze the complex nature of Chinese involvement in global governance structures. Power transition theory and Institutionalism deserve more attention and analysis regarding China's rise. Power transition theory from the realism paradigm of international relations is founded on the fact that shifts in power balance occur when a potential power challenger gains and even surpasses the capabilities of the current dominant power (Goh, 2019). This theory is quite relevant to China because the latter has experienced the growth of economic and military power in recent decades. From this perspective, as China rises, this bureaucracy becomes more likely to push against the U.S.-led international system and try to build a world order that is more favorable to its interests. From this theoretical point of view, such shifts can bring about oscillations and conflicts as the emergent and the dominant powers reassess their status. For China, it could mean advocating changes in international trade, money, and security rules to conform to the new power status.

Goldstein has unveiled power transition theory as lacking independent variables that can account for systemic changes fundamentally. Another perspective, namely Institutionalism, gives different ideas that either supinator or contradict the power transition theory. The institution encourages international organizations and institutions with established international norms and standards. From this perspective, it is possible to recognize China's policy as a policy of integration rather than confrontation (McKinney, 2019). By participating in and sometimes chairing work with substantial international organizations such as the United Nations and the WTO, as well as through regional cooperation such as the SCO, China can positively influence those organizations more, not obtrusively. Instimannerlism maintains that these bodies suppress conflict because they are a venue for dialogue and a peaceful resolution. Increasing Chinese influence may make the world more integrated and interdependent (Peters, 2022). Both theoretical perspectives are necessary to understand China's world approach better. Power transition theory draws our attention to the potential conflict over power distribution. At the same time, Institutionalism offers guidelines on how a logically emerging China might ensure its power expansion is peacefully accepted through reference to norms and institutions (Kourula et al., 2019). These provide a more complex picture of China's trajectories in transforming the international system—a possessor of disruptive potentials or a mainstream actor of the status quo. The double perspective also contributes to configuring possible futures for China and, thus, understanding the role that the Middle Kingdom has to play in international politics in the foreseeable future.

Previous Research

Research on China's rise in global governance has generated substantial literature covering trade, security, environmentalism, and development (Demiryol, 2022). These surveys have greatly helped the understanding of China's political actor status. Nevertheless, in the existing literature, there is a noticeable absence of a theoretical framework that would connect China's economic policies with its political and security aims under conditions of globalization. This deficiency shows that China's ambitious overseas plan requires a comprehensive understanding of the four governance dimensions.

Previous studies have focused on China's accession to the global order's standard bearers, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and other key organizations (Liu, 2024). Far less has been written on how China has used these shifts to build new platforms and bilateral ties

to expand its global reach—especially in the Global South. These dynamics are important because they occur beyond the visible shift of global governance architecture and are characterized by softer power relations.

Compared to the BRI and other measures, more specific analyses of how these plans align with China's broader objectives in political and security dimensions are still needed (Economy & Walton, 2020). The BRI is not only an economic integration project but also a geopolitical project to extend China's power, which indicates that it is a hybrid of economic and security concerns.

This article seeks to close these research gaps by comprehensively evaluating China's behaviors and engagements in traditional international organizations and its state and behavior in emerging new platforms and bilateral (AZNAR, 2021). In this way, it aims to understand better the interconnection between Chinese economic, political, and security approaches and their effects on worldwide regulation. This approach is crucial to capturing the full range of China's global effects and the complex strategies it uses in remaking world power relations.

Hypotheses Development

Based on the reviewed literature, this study proposes several hypotheses to guide further investigation:

- **H1:** China's engagement in global governance institutions has significantly shifted from passive participation to active leadership, influencing international norms and practices.
- **H2:** China uses its economic leverage to gain political and strategic gains in global governance, potentially at the expense of the established Western-led order.
- **H3:** China's initiatives, such as the BRI, are strategically designed to create new norms and institutions that reflect its governance values and interests.

These hypotheses are intended to analyze the versatility of China's relations with the rest of the world and express a range of profound questions concerning this country's role in the contemporary world. They also consider the potential outcomes of its growing influence on the development of further international cooperation and order. This article will analyze China's strategic roles in the global and regional systems through a systematic review and formulation of a hypothesis.

Research Design

The validity of this approach is based on a quantitative research design that can be effective in generating numerical findings applicable to different settings. Evaluating numerous results for patterns and connections is appropriate, enabling a sound study of China's strategies within the international system and their effects on global governance (Can & Chan, 2020). Using statistical methods means that more actual hypotheses stemming from important theoretical theories like power transition theory and institutionalism can be tested. Each of these theories offers an analytical framework into which the extent and character of Chinese impact on norms and structures can be fitted. Using these quantitative methods systematically, the study intends to identify underlying patterns between China's ascendance and changes in global governance while ensuring that the conclusions arrived at are empirically grounded and statistically valid.

The data for this study were carefully extracted from Kaggle, a site that hosts a large variety of datasets submitted by users and other organizations worldwide. The variables used in the datasets include China's GDP, exports and imports, FDI, defense spending, and memberships in various international organizations. These specific data sets have been selected because they offer quantifiable measures that can easily bring out the intensity and spread of China's global economic

and strategic activities. Such datasets legalistic and inclusive nature is significant for analyzing China's versatile impact on global governance. It utilizes the richness of these data types to examine the direct and systemic effects of China's ascent, scrutinizing its strategies in the system structure (Glantz, 2020).

Data Analysis

The data analysis for this study employed SPSS software, a prestigious statistical software commonly used in social sciences due to its effectiveness in data analysis. The analysis proceeded in two primary phases: Descriptive and Inferential. These are two kinds of statistics that are used at different times in the course of our analysis.

Descriptive Statistics: Concepts of descriptive statistics used to offer detailed information about the datasets. It is a very important stage because it gives the first view of the data collected and measures of center (mean, median, mode) and dispersion (range, standard deviation), which provide general information about the data distribution. This first step helps check whether the data is accurate and checks for outliers or any other discrepancies. Further, it helps to analyze the trends in the Chinese economy, its trade relations, military budget, and numerous other factors from the data set.

Inferential Statistics: After a descriptive analysis has been done, inferential statistics used to analyze the hypothesis derived from the theoretical frameworks. This phase generates conclusion about the rest of the populous populaces entered by the sample data. Key to this analysis will be:

- **Regression Analysis:** This statistical method tried to compare China's economic features and ability to shape international governance. Regression analysis will be useful in identifying changes in China's economic prowess and strategies for emerging roles and strategies of global governance. This is especially important when comparing the rise of economic capabilities and the improvement of the corresponding influence in the international arena.
- ANOVA (Analysis of Variance): An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare data from several regions and time periods. This analysis will also help us understand whether there is a statistically significant difference in China's role and effect on global governance by geographic or temporal frames. This indicated the means-end consistency and variability of the Chinese strategies in the various settings.

These statistical tests helped to identify relevant trends and patterns necessary for defining the extent and nature of China's strategic actions within the system. Such a strict method allows for excluding conclusions based on the presence of some factors, the assurance of a reliable statistical analysis of the data, and an understanding of China's role in transforming the existing model of the global governance system.

Limitations

Despite the methodological soundness of this study, some limitations were identified, which, when borne in mind, will help give the results of this study the correct interpretation they deserve. One of the main constraints concerns using second-party data obtained from Kaggle, a third-party data repository. It could impact the study since such databases may not capture the nuances of the current tendencies of International Relations and Global Governance (Pearson et al., 2022). The use of secondary data may also be affected by potential biases, mistakes in the data-gathering process, or outdated information that could affect the credibility of the research. The choice of the quantitative method as the study approach, when a focus is made on large data sets, is useful to generalize findings but does not consider the qualitative aspect that plays an essential role in

diplomacy and international relations. Quantitative approaches leave out critical factors like diplomatic talk, leadership's possible plans, and inclusive cultural elements in the program plan. This methodological orientation might not capture all that occurs in the complex and diverse international interactions and diplomatic processes. In statistics, the conclusions obtained from applying statistical tests are usually based on the assumption that underlies each statistical model. A few of the most common problems that can lead to distorted results that are easy to misinterpret include the multicollinearity problem, the presence of heteroscedasticity, or the non-normality of the residuals. The high complexity of the analyzed models often entails difficulties in understanding the role of variables and context; this results in an occasional oversimplification of the cause-and-effect relationships in the researched field (Sutter, 2020). By pointing out such research limitations, the study assumes a broader perspective of the results and frames up further research opportunities. Future work could extend the analysis by including primary data collection and adding at least some qualitative measures to eliminate such gaps and discuss the state of China in global governance more comprehensively.

Data Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistical analysis provides a good starting point for understanding China's specific quantitative economic status and role in global governance. Based on the study's data availability and data collection exercise, the analysis focuses on a sample of 61 observations.

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
gdp	61	4720935900 5.0000000000 0000	1472270000 0000.000000 0000000	25766762359 96.754400000 000000	4218999968 636.872000 000000000
gdp_percent	61	.016002689	.189870032	.05187656810	.045313394 109
China_Trade_Influenc e	61	.109666767	9.960121886	5.1892761540 7	2.75518575 8826
China_FDI	61	1074.294135	9656.245046	5165.6248491 8	2552.13479 9688
Global_Governance_I ndex	61	.003021886	.975191396	.48290843384	.306308132 569
Valid N (listwise)	61				

GDP: The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China has revealed a greater fluctuation in the observed period, starting at nearly \$47.21 billion and reaching a high of about \$14.72 trillion. The average GDP in that period was about \$2.58 trillion, implying economic growth and development. The standard deviation of \$4.22 trillion reflects the high volatility of GDP, likely linked to several improvements in Chinese economic systems, market changes, and its external economic environment during these years.

GDP Percent of Global Economy: The figures portray the importance of the Chinese economy in the world economy, where the GDP share fluctuated between a low of 0.016% and a high of


approximately 0.19% at the time. On average, China's GDP accounted for approximately 0.052% of the global economy, highlighting its rising status as an economic powerhouse. The standard deviation of 0.045 indicates moderate fluctuation regarding its relativity with the global economy, indicating the impact of China's domestic economic environment and the world climate.

China Trade Influence: China's trade influence score ranged from a low of about 0.11 to a high of 9.96, indicating significant variance in its ability to affect global trade policies and practices. The average trade influence score of approximately 5.19 underscores China's consistent role as a major player in international trade. A standard deviation of approximately 2.76 reflects variability in influence, possibly linked to changes in China's trade strategies and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.

China FDI (Foreign Direct Investment): China's FDI ranged from approximately \$1074 to \$9656 million, demonstrating its growing role as a source of foreign capital. The average FDI of about \$5166 million indicates China's robust foreign investment activity, reinforcing its strategic economic engagements worldwide. The standard deviation of approximately \$2552 million suggests fluctuating investment levels, which could be attributed to varying economic conditions and changes in China's foreign investment policies.

Global Governance Index: The Global Governance Index ranged from 0.003 to approximately 0.975, showing the extent to which China's role and influence in global governance structures varied. An average index score of 0.483 indicates moderate involvement and influence in global governance, which may reflect its strategic interests and participation in international institutions. The standard deviation of 0.306 suggests considerable fluctuation in how significantly China has been involved in or affected global governance, which domestic political shifts and international relations dynamics could impact.

This descriptive analysis provides a foundation for understanding the scale and variability of China's economic growth, trade influence, FDI activities, and participation in global governance. It sets the stage for a deeper analysis of how these factors interrelate and influence global economic and political frameworks.



The "China's GDP Trends over the Period" graph shows the oscillation of China's Mean Global Governance Index between 1961 and 2020. The chosen index shows high volatility of the topic,

with fluctuations corresponding to essential political, economic, and international processes determining China's position in global governance. The early years showed more stability because, during this period, there was little international business. The index indicates more oscillations after 1980, especially after liberalization and reformation. Expansion during this liberalization and rapid growth period resulted in a higher level of engagement in world affairs, as shown by the higher volatilities and peaks. These SWOT fluctuation, especially after 2000, depicts a more complicated relationship between China's newly emerging economic might and its roles and strategies in global governance. Zooming on China's diplomatic map and foreign policy, as indicated in the graph, China's economic achievements and policy transformations Revelation presents China's diplomatic position and its ability to contribute to the current and emerging international institutions of governance.

Correlations Analysis

The correlation analysis was undertaken to understand the relationship between China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP percent, Trade Influence, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and the Global Governance Index. This discussion helped elucidate the contingent relationships between these economic variables and their likely implications for China's contribution to the global governance.

Correlations

	gdp	gdp_percent	China_Trade_ Influence	China_FDI	Global_Governance_Index
Pearson Correlation	1	.982**	017	281*	.079
Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.894	.028	.543
N	61	61	61	61	61
Pearson Correlation	.982**	1	031	289*	.069
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.814	.024	.599
N	61	61	61	61	61
Pearson Correlation	017	031	1	.056	.034
Sig. (2-tailed)	.894	.814		.669	.793
N	61	61	61	61	61
Pearson Correlation	281*	289*	.056	1	.070
Sig. (2-tailed)	.028	.024	.669		.592
N	61	61	61	61	61
Pearson Correlation	.079	.069	.034	.070	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	.543	.599	.793	.592	
N	61	61	61	61	61
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. (2-tailed)	Pearson 1 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N 61 Pearson .982** Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 61 Pearson017 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .894 N 61 Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .028 N 61 Pearson .028 N 61 Pearson .079 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .543	Pearson Correlation 1 .982** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 61 61 Pearson .982** 1 Correlation .000 N 61 61 Pearson .017 031 Correlation .894 .814 N 61 61 Pearson .281* 289* Correlation .028 .024 N 61 61 Pearson .079 .069 Correlation .543 .599	Influence Pearson Correlation 1 .982** 017 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .894 N 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation .982** 1 031 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .814 N 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation 017 031 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .894 .814 N 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation 281* 289* .056 Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .024 .669 N 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation .079 .069 .034 Correlation .543 .599 .793	Influence Pearson Correlation 1 .982** 017 281* Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .894 .028 N 61 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation .982*** 1 031 289* Correlation .982*** 1 031 289* N 61 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation 017 031 1 .056 Sig. (2-tailed) .894 .814 .669 .669 N 61 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation 281* 289* .056 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .024 .669 N 61 61 61 61 Pearson Correlation .079 .069 .034 .070 Correlation .543 .599 .793 .592

^{**.} Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

^{*.} Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

GDP and GDP Percent ($\mathbf{r} = .982$, $\mathbf{p} < .001$): The statistical analysis also reveals that the relationship between GDP and GDP percent is highly positively correlated and is also significant. This means that as the GDP rises, the share of this country in the overall economy also rises, indicating forcefully the day-lust dominance of the economy of China over the rest of the world economies.

GDP and China Trade Influence ($\mathbf{r} = -.017$, $\mathbf{p} = .894$): The results also reveal no relationship between GDP and China Trade Influence. This implies that being that China has a large economy does not directly explain trade influence, suggesting that other factors may explain trade influence better.

GDP and China FDI ($\mathbf{r} = -.281$, $\mathbf{p} = .028$): A weak negative relationship is observed between GDP and China FDI, with a correlation coefficient significant at the .05 level. This might suggest that with each passing year and with the growth in the size of the Chinese economy, the share of FDI in this economy might decline due to domestic investment or other economic activities.

GDP and Global Governance Index (r = .079, p = .543): The relationship between GDP and the Global Governance Index is virtually zero. This also considers that simple factors such as a country's GDP are not the best determinant of international influence in governance, thus underlining the factors of international relations as more dynamic.

GDP Percent and China FDI ($\mathbf{r} = -.289$, $\mathbf{p} = .024$): As with the case of GDP, the percent of GDP correlates significantly but negatively with China's FDI at the 0.05 level. This supports the argument advanced here that as China's relative GDP size rises, external FDI as a percentage of the economy may actually decline.

China Trade Influence, China FDI, and Global Governance Index: There were no strong positive or negative correlations between these variables and others, suggesting that they share little or poor linear relationship. The absence of stronger relationships with these variables indicates a certain combination and non-linear nature of trade influence, FDI, and governance participation in the respective nations.

The correlation findings show that economic size is strongly associated with GDP and GDP percent but is not synonymous with relative gains in trade influence and governance participation. The low or negative correlations with trade-related factors such as trade influence, FDI, and governance index underscore the relative interaction between economic might, strategic politics, and other factors in determining China's global standing.

Regression Analysis

The regression analysis was expected to show how GDP, China's Trade Influence, and FDI affected the Global Governance Index.

Such assessment reveals how these economic factors could act as antecedents for China in the context of international governance structures.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate			
1	.128ª	.016	035	.311663809587			
a. Predictors: (Constant), China_FDI, China_Trade_Influence, gdp							

The obtained R-value equals 0.128, meaning there is a very low correlation between the predictors and the Global Governance Index. R Square of 0.016 implies that 1.6% of the variation in the GGI can be accounted for by the three independent variables: GDP, China's Trade Influence, and China's FDI. This is a very low score and entertained scores on the model and the weaker the model. The Adjusted R Square is negative, which is -0.035. This shows that the model does not fit the data well, and for prediction, the model will do worse than a simple mean.

ANOVA^a

Mod	el	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	${f F}$	Sig.
1	Regression	.093	3	.031	.319	.812 ^b
	Residual	5.537	57	.097		
	Total	5.629	60			


- a. Dependent Variable: Global Governance Index
- b. Predictors: (Constant), China_FDI, China_Trade_Influence, gdp

The F-test value of 0.319 indicates that the model is not statistically significant at a 0.812 significance level. This means that the model containing these predictors did not fare better and was statistically equivalent to a model devoid of any predictors.

Coefficientsa

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	В	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	.384	.126		3.058	.003
gdp	7.808E-15	.000	.108	.786	.435
China_Trade_Influe nce	.003	.015	.031	.233	.816
China_FDI	1.183E-5	.000	.099	.719	.475

The model's intercept is also statistically significant (t = 3.058, p = 0.003), which shows that the Global Governance Index has a starting value of zero when all the predictors are zero. The coefficient for GDP estimated as 7.808E-15 is very close to zero, and its significance level is equal to (P = 0.435), which confirms that GDP has no influence on the Global Governance Index within this specification. The coefficient for China Trade Influence is also small (0.003) and nonsignificant (p = 0.816); within the framework of this model, trade influence does not impact the governance index. For China FDI, we find that the coefficient (1.183E-5) is very small and insignificant (p = 0.475), suggesting that FDI does not significantly influence the Global Governance Index.



The presented scatter plot called "GDP vs Global Governance Index" shows the data distribution and absence of a significant positive correlation between China's GDP and its Global Governance Index. The plot presents the GDP distribution with variations, and GG scores are mostly in the middle range with no clear increase/decrease pattern along the GDP values increase. This distribution suggests that whilst China's GDP has grown astronomically, its contribution to our position in global governance, using the index, does not increase proportionally or directly with GDP growth. Some scattered points show where high GGI was obtained at the expense of moderately low or vice versa; this points to the fact that the economy does not just dictate geopolitical influence. This goes a long way in supporting the argument that the size of the economy as a single component of the economy, no matter the magnitude, is huge. Other components are as vital as the economic might in determining the capability of any country's governance in the international relations sphere.

Discussion

In this chapter, the author synthesizes the results from descriptive statistics, correlation, and regression analysis regarding China's GDP, Trade Influence, FDI, and Goldstein's Global Governance Index. The information acquired enhances the understanding of Chinese measurements involving relative global governance, analyzing the shifting dynamics in China's roles in the world economy and politics. To start the analysis, general economic indicators and engagement levels with the global economy of China were identified based on 61 basic figures. China's GDP fluctuated between \$47.21 billion and about \$14.72 trillion, showing that the Chinese economy has grown and expanded with an average of approximately 2.58 trillion. This high variability and a rather large S indicate fluctuations of intense economic activity affected by internal reforms and the external economic environment. China's proportion of the world economy has been increasing, which implies that China is gaining increased control of the international market (Cohn & Hira, 2020). The extent of trade influence and FDI statistics also showed high volatility and good interaction with international trade and investment. The Global Governance Index presented significant ups and downs, indicating the variable participation caused by China's internal policy and external strategy.

Descriptive analysis showed that GDP and GDP percent are positively correlated, indicating that as China's economy grows, so does its relative share of the world economy. Taking into account the lack of association between Trade Influence and GDP, as well as between the Global Governance Index and GDP, we can conclude that greater economic size does not necessarily imply enhanced global governance influence (Gereffi, 2019). This suggests geopolitics is not just a measure of economic power but politics, diplomacy, and geopolitics considerations. The regression analysis, employed to estimate the GG Index solely based on the economically related criteria, showed that the model's estimation was very low; only 1.6 % of the index's variance was explained by the predictors. This tends to reinforce the perception that China's increased influence in global governance depends not only on its economic capability. That said, some of the discrepancies the model exposes indicate that the economic trends are insufficient to account for International Relations and global governance. The graphical aids bolstered the quantitative analysis, especially the scatter plot on GDP and GGI. We find no evidence of a trend in the plot, supporting the idea that the association between the rate of economic development and the level of assumed global governance roles is complex and not positive or proportional. By presenting you with the scope and data this visualization provides, I emphasize that geopolitical influence goes beyond simple numbers and is influenced by various intricate factors. The analysis presented in the study thus refutes some of the conventions that equate economic capital with international politics (Gill & Huang, 2023). Even though this increase in China's economy is clear, it has not translated to China having a proportionately larger say in how the international governance system operates. These findings point towards the proposition that policymakers and scholars require calling for a much-complicated analysis of Chinese international relations about culture, economy, and politics. Further research can be extended to qualitative data to assess other characteristics of diplomacy and policy effectiveness that are other ignored in quantitative research. Perhaps, with the addition of political and cultural coordinates, a more comprehensive examination of determinants underlies China's global governance position (De Graaff et al., 2020). As the chapter shows, while China has become more economically powerful, this has not necessarily led to a corresponding rise in its sense of global governance responsibility (Yan, 2019). This underlines the interactions of economic development with strategic, political, and cultural factors that define roles in the world. Information of these dynamics is important for forming global economics and politics, especially within the paradigm of newcomers like China. This basic study opens the path to subsequent studies of global influence and governance in multiple sectors.

Conclusion

This research aimed to start a heuristic analytical investigation of China's place in international regulation in terms of economic yardsticks: GDP, percentage of the global GDP, volume of trading power, and FDI. These have shed light on the endogenous and latent connections between these economic measures and China's presence in world governance, as represented in the Global Governance Index. The analysis of the above studies highlighted the following insights: A China that is far more prosperous than before and with a bigger share of the global economy does not necessarily mean that it wields more influence in shaping global governance (Economy & Walton, 2020). The coefficient of correlation showed a very high correlation between GDP and GDP percent, proving that as the economy size of China enhances, so does its relative measure of economic significance regarding the global economy. The explorations revealed that GDP and FDI do not clearly influence the dynamics of the Global Governance Index. This implies that political influence cannot be determined solely by the size of the national economy and the related outward economic investment. The regression analysis particularly highlighted this. The model itself only explained 1.6% of the variations in the GGI. Co such outcomes indicate the existence of other

significant drivers not addressed in this economic-centered study, including the political, cultural, and institutional factors. This research contributes to theories on international relations and global governance as it contradicts the established premise that economic prowess forms a reciprocation for political clout in the international system. The present research highlights theoretical concepts and empirical evidence of the complex economic relationships between developed nations, which are often masked under the theories of international relations that tend to suggest total economic dominion over relations. The outcomes support a multifaceted approach to analyzing global governance, focusing on economic, political, and, to some extent, cultural aspects. This study adds to the scholarship on China's rise and shift in the international system by empirically investigating how China's economic power has complemented its action plans and posts in the global governance architecture (Sutter, 2020). Emerging economies such as China can shape the international system, which is useful information for policymakers, scholars, and strategists in global politics. The research work presented in this thesis opens up several opportunities for further studies to build more knowledge of global governance and the role emerging powers such as China may play. Future studies could explore the following areas:

Embedding political and cultural factors into the model could enhance the current efforts to address the factors underlying changes in the global governance indices. Further, studying China might examine political, bilateral, multilateral, and cultural diplomacy as they apply to China and color their place in world diplomacy. As a form of triangulation, qualitative research could elaborate on the findings by exploring some so-called' cases' where China's economic processes overlapped with its foreign policies. This could include work on large-scale projects such as the Belt & Road Approach and how various policies are received and engaged in by various players. China could be compared with other emergent or older epoch superpowers to understand the differences and similarities in the process that enables the shift of economic power to foreign relations power. Such a comparative scheme may also be useful for revealing specific characteristics of China's approach and obtaining a more comprehensive view of the processes occurring in the world (Rolland, 2020). The future, which is much broader than the present, might reveal some fundamental changes in China's approach to regulating the world in experiments and cases of longer-term studies. Such a perspective would be especially helpful in analyzing the effects of contemporary and future world emergencies on international relations, including those of virus and environmental types. Although China's economic growth is a force to reckon with within the global economy, it has shaped the process using many factors to mediate its impact on international governance processes. This work underscores the general argument for adopting an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing relations between nations, and liberal economic reductionism is to be rejected for consideration of a more complex canvas of power relations. China has and will continue to transform and reinvent itself in this world. These insights will remain pertinent to anyone deeply involved in global governance.

Conflict of Interest

The authors showed no conflict of interest.

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
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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive St	atisti	cs			
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
gdp	61	4720935900 5.000000000 0000	1472270000 0000.000000 0000000	2576676235996. 7544000000000 00	4218999968636.8720 00000000000
gdp_percent	61	.016002689	.189870032	.05187656810	.045313394109
China_Trade _Influence	61	.109666767	9.960121886	5.18927615407	2.755185758826
China_FDI	61	1074.294135	9656.245046	5165.62484918	2552.134799688
Global_Gove rnance_Index	61	.003021886	.975191396	.48290843384	.306308132569
Valid N (listwise)	61				



Correlations Analysis

Correlation	ns	Correlations									
		gdp	gdp_percent	China_Trade _Influence	China_FDI	Global_Governance_ Index					
gdp	Pearson Correlation	1	.982**	017	281*	.079					
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.894	.028	.543					
	N	61	61	61	61	61					
gdp_percent	Pearson Correlation	.982**	1	031	289*	.069					
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.814	.024	.599					
	N	61	61	61	61	61					
China_Trade_	Pearson Correlation	017	031	1	.056	.034					
Influence	Sig. (2-tailed)	.894	.814		.669	.793					
	N	61	61	61	61	61					
China_FDI	Pearson Correlation	281*	289*	.056	1	.070					
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.028	.024	.669		.592					
	N	61	61	61	61	61					
Global_Gover	Pearson Correlation	.079	.069	.034	.070	1					
nance_Index	Sig. (2-tailed)	.543	.599	.793	.592						
	N	61	61	61	61	61					

Regression Analysis

Model Summary								
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate				
1	.128ª	.016	035	.311663809587				
a. Predictors: (Constant), China_FDI, China_Trade_Influence, gdp								

^{*.} Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

ANOVA ^a									
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.			
1	Regression	.093	3	.031	.319	.812 ^b			
	Residual	5.537	57	.097					
	Total	5.629	60						
a Dependent Varia	ble: Global, G	lovernance Inc	lex	•	•	•			

a. Dependent Variable: Global_Governance_Index

b. Predictors: (Constant), China_FDI, China_Trade_Influence, gdp

Coefficients ^a									
Model		Unstanda Coeffi		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.			
		В	Std. Error	Beta					
1	(Constant)	.384	.126		3.058	.003			
	gdp	7.808E-15	.000	.108	.786	.435			
	China_Trade_Influe nce	.003	.015	.031	.233	.816			
	China_FDI	1.183E-5	.000	.099	.719	.475			
a. De _l	pendent Variable: Globa	l_Governance	_Index		•				

